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Abstract—Distance-bounding protocols are able to measure a
secure upper bound to the distance between two devices. They
are designed to resist to reduction attacks, whose objective is
reducing the measured distance. In this paper we focus on the
opposite problem, the enlargement attack, which is aimed at
enlarging the measured distance. We analyze the feasibility of
enlargement attacks through overshadow strategies on 802.15.4a
UWB distance-bounding protocols. We show that the overshadow
strategies, generally considered feasible by the existing literature,
are actually difficult to carry out. Depending on the delay
introduced by the adversary, there are cases in which they have
no effect or their effect is not controllable.
Index Terms—Distance bounding, IEEE 802.15.4a, distance-
enlargement attacks, overshadow attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE problem of measuring a distance in the presence ofan adversary wanting to disrupt the measurement process
is well studied. Brands and Chaum [1] proposed the first
distance-bounding protocols (see [2] and references therein),
which are able to measure a secure upper bound to the distance
between a verifier and a prover. The fundamental property of
such protocols is to resist to reduction attacks, in which an
adversary wants the distance to appear smaller than it actually
is. The resistance to reduction attacks is enough for those
applications which must assure a physical proximity between
two devices, for example chip-and-PIN payments, proximity-
based access control, secure geographical routing, anti-theft
systems [3], and so on.
Distance-bounding protocols can also be used in
trilateration-like techniques, to securely estimate the position
of a device [4]. However, they require a high number of
anchor nodes with respect to classic trilateration, because
they have to deal with enlargement attacks, in which the
adversary spoofs the measured distance to be larger than it
actually is.
The existing literature about physical-layer attacks focused
mainly on distance reduction. In [5] the authors introduced
early-detection and late-commit attacks, by which it is pos-
sible to reduce the measured distance without attacking the
overlying cryptographic protocol. In [6] a simple attack is
proposed, in which the adversary can obtain random and un-
controllable distance reductions in two-way ranging protocols
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Fig. 1. TWR procedure.
implemented with ultra-wide band (UWB) signals. In [3] the
authors analyzed reduction attacks against distance-bounding
protocols realized on IEEE 802.15.4a UWB PHY [7]. Enlarge-
ment attacks performed through jam-and-replay strategies are
studied in [8].
In this paper we analyze the feasibility of enlargement
attacks against 802.15.4a-based distance-bounding protocols
working in indoor scenarios. In particular, we focus on en-
largement attacks performed through overshadow strategies. In
an overshadow strategy, the adversary receives and retransmits
a legitimate packet with a certain delay and a stronger power.
The legitimate packet gets thus “overshadowed” by a delayed
copy of it. In this way, the adversary tries to delay the entire
process of round-trip time measurement. In general, over-
shadow strategies are considered feasible in the literature [4].
Instead, we show that they are not easy to carry out and,
depending on the delay introduced by the adversary, there
are cases in which they have no effect or their effect is not
controllable.
II. TWO-WAY RANGING AND DISTANCE BOUNDING
Two-way ranging (TWR) is the most widely used procedure
to estimate the distance between two devices, i.e., a verifier
(V) and a prover (P) in an asynchronous wireless network [9].
The TWR procedure works as follows (cfr. Fig. 1). First, V
sends a request packet to P at time t0. P receives it at time
t1, after a time of flight Tof = dV,P/c, where dV,P is the
distance between V and P and c is the speed of light. After
some delay Td, P replies with an acknowledgement packet
at time t2. The reply arrives at V at time t3 after Tof . The
verifier can estimate Tof = (t3−t0−Td)/2, since the value of
Td is assumed known to V as well. Finally, the V-P distance
is obtained by dV,P = Tof · c.
In order for the TWR procedure to give an accurate distance
estimate, P and V must precisely measure the arrival times
of the packets they receive. Wireless UWB protocols provide
nanosecond precision, leading to a sub-meter accuracy on
distance estimation.
The TWR procedure is not secure by itself. An external
adversary can indeed impersonate a legitimate prover and
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verifier into measuring a false distance. A proposed solution
is to implement a distance-bounding protocol [1] on the top
of it. A simple example, proposed in [3] for 802.15.4a-based
systems, is the following:
REQ V −→ P : a
ACK P −→ V : b
SGN P −→ V : HS(a, b)
The request packet (REQ) and the acknowledgment packet
(ACK) convey, respectively, a and b, which are two indepen-
dent and unpredictable sequences of bits. The signature packet
(SGN) authenticates the request and the acknowledgment by
means of a shared secret S. The verifier estimates the distance
between itself and the prover, by measuring the round-trip time
between REQ and ACK packets. We use such a protocol as
our reference distance-bounding protocol. The considerations
we make about the overshadow attack hold for more complex
distance-bounding protocols as well.
III. IEEE 802.15.4A PHYSICAL LAYER
We focus on the IEEE 802.15.4a standard [7] for TWR
operations. IEEE 802.15.4a introduces an impulse radio ultra-
wide band (IR-UWB) PHY protocol capable of sub-meter
precision in TWR operations in indoor or urban environments.
It has been the first standardized UWB protocol for precise
ranging, and it is one of the most probable choices for future
implementations of wireless distance-bounding protocols [3].
On the contrary, there is no such requirement for the SGN.
So we are free to map it into another UWB packet, as well as
into a packet of a different protocol, e.g. “vanilla” 802.15.4. To
better analyze the feasibility of overshadow-based enlargement
attacks against 802.15.4a UWB, it is necessary to explore the
effects of such attacks from a physical-layer point of view.
Thus, in the following we give some more details on the
structure of the transmitted signal prescribed by the 802.15.4a
IEEE standard [7] and on a characteristic ranging algorithm
suited for it. The UWB packets are made up of three major
segments: a synchronization header (SHR), a physical-layer
header (PHR), and a data field. We begin by describing the
SHR, which is used for the time-of-arrival (TOA) estimation.
The SHR consists of two blocks: a synchronization preamble
(SYNC) and a start-of-frame delimiter (SFD). The mathemat-
ical model of the signal transmitted during the SHR is:
s (t) =
NSHR−1∑
i=0
aiψ (t− iTsym) (1)
where NSHR = NSY NC + NSFD, NSY NC and NSFD are
the number of symbols in the SYNC and SFD, respectively,
and Tsym is the symbol duration. Symbols ai are all equal to
1 during the SYNC while they take values {−1, 0,+1} during
the SFD. Finally, ψ(t) is expressed as:
ψ (t) 
Kpbs−1∑
k=0
dkp (t− kTpr) (2)
where {dk}Kpbs−1k=0 is a perfectly balanced sequence with
elements {−1, 0,+1}, p(t) is an ultra-short causal pulse
(monocycle) and Tpr  Tsym/Kpbs is the pulse repetition
period.
The transmitted signal s(t) arrives at the receiver through
multiple propagation paths (multipath channel), characterized
by different attenuations and delays. Denoting by h(t) the
channel response (CR) to p(t)1, the received signal can be
written as
r (t) =
NSHR−1∑
i=0
Kpbs−1∑
k=0
aidkh (t− kTpr − iTsym − tTOA) +
+ w (t)
where w(t) is thermal noise. In the above equation, tTOA is
the time-of-arrival instant of the signal at the receiver and
represents the parameter to be measured. It coincides with
t1 or t3 in the verifier-prover and prover-verifier channels,
respectively, according to the TWR procedure depicted in
Fig. 1.
We consider a simple non-coherent energy-based receiver
which guarantees high ranging precision with low cost and
low power consumption. Here, r(t) is first passed through a
band-pass filter (BPF), to remove the extra-band noise, and
then is demodulated in a square-law device followed by a
low-pass filter (LPF).
The ranging operation is concerned with the estimation of
the position, tPHR, of the first peak of the first pulse of the
PHR [7]. Such a peak represents the arrival of the ranging
marker and is conventionally taken as the time of arrival of the
entire signal packet [7]. In fact, estimating tPHR is equivalent
to estimate tTOA, since tTOA = tPHR −NSHRTsym.
We consider the TOA-estimation procedure described in [9],
but the conclusions we draw are valid also with other
threshold-based TOA estimation algorithms. In particular,
TOA estimation is performed in the following three steps. The
frame detection step decides through energy measurements
whether a packet is present or not. The fine timing acquisition
step produces a fine estimate of the arrival time tPHR with
an ambiguity of multiples of Tsym. Finally, the SFD detection
step disambiguates the estimate of tPHR through a correlation
mechanism.
We write tPHR as a multiple of Tsym plus a fractional part
τf ∈ [0, Tsym), i.e., tPHR = τf + NTsym. The fine timing
acquisition phase and the SFD detection phase deal with the
estimation of τf and N , respectively.
We now focus on the fine timing acquisition procedure.
Indeed, as we show later, this is the only step of the rang-
ing operation that the adversary can attack. The fine timing
acquisition scheme we analyze is described in detail in [9]
and essentially consists in the correlation of the signal y(t)
at the output of LPF with Kpbs cyclic-shifted versions of the
sequence {d2k}Kpbs−1k=0 . This produces a Tsym-long signal, say
SFE(t)
2
, whose support is in the interval [0, Tsym), which is
used for the estimation of τf . Specifically, the estimation of
τf is performed in two steps. In the first step (highest-peak
search) the position τHP of the maximum of SFE(t) is sought
for. In the second step (leading-peak search), starting from
1Without loss of generality, it is assumed that h(t) starts at t = 0.
2For t = m˜Tpr + ε˜, with 0 ≤ m˜ ≤ Kpbs − 1 and ε˜ ∈ [0, Tpr), SFE(t)
coincides with S′(m˜, ε˜) defined in [9].
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Fig. 2. Fine timing acquisition procedure.
τHP we jump back by Δback seconds and proceed forward
looking for the first time SFE(t) crosses a given threshold
λ whose value depends on the thermal noise. The distance
of the crossing time from the beginning of SFE(t) provides
an estimate of τf . The fine timing acquisition procedure is
described in Fig. 2.
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider an adversary (M) who wants to deceive the
verifier into accepting a specific enlarged distance measure-
ment. Since the distance measurement is obtained from a
round-trip time measurement at V, the adversary’s aim is to
enlarge such a round-trip time measurement, by introducing
a controlled delay. She tries to obtain this by means of an
overshadow strategy. Following this strategy, the adversary
eavesdrops and retransmits a legitimate UWB packet with a
certain delay and a stronger power. The legitimate signal and
the adversarial one get thus overlapped at the victim’s receiver.
The idea at the basis of the attack is that the victim receiving
two signals, both characterized by the expected structure,
will hook to the stronger (malicious) one, thus obtaining an
enlarged measurement of the round-trip time. Note that the
adversary must transmit its signal in such a way that only the
victim receiver is able to hear it. Otherwise, the presence of
a malicious transmitter would be easily detected. This attack
is considered feasible by the literature [4].
The adversary can attack the prover (by overshadowing
the REQ), as well as the verifier (by overshadowing the
ACK), as well as both. Without loss of generality, we assume
overshadowing of the REQ signal but the analysis holds also
for the ACK-overshadowing attack.
Finally, we observe that our adversary has no interest in
jamming the legitimate signal or a part of it. In fact, jamming
would not avoid the prover from starting the TOA estimation
procedure, which is triggered by an energy threshold (cfr.
Section III). It would only disturb the TOA measurement in
a random way, causing delays which are not controllable by
the adversary.
V. FEASIBILITY OF THE OVERSHADOW ATTACK
First of all, we observe that an overshadow attack has not
a harmful effect on the frame detection procedure. It only
produces the positive effect of increasing the energy measured
by the receiver thus anticipating the estimation of the presence
of the packet.
The overshadow attack may have a harmful effect on the
SFD detection. However, it would result in a delay multiple
of Tsym = 3968 ns [7]. Such a delay corresponds to an
enlargement of 595m, which is unrealistic for an indoor sce-
nario. We assume that the application layer employs threshold
mechanisms to exclude enlargements longer than 595m.
Now, we analyze the effects of the overshadow attack on
the fine timing acquisition procedure. We make the pessimistic
hypothesis that M is synchronized with V and has a perfect
knowledge of the position of both P and V. Under these
assumptions, M can make its message to arrive at P with
a controlled delay ΔT relative to the message sent by V.
Therefore, the signal received by P is:
r(t) = rV (t) + rM (t−ΔT ) (3)
where rV (t) and rM (t) are the signals associated to V and
M, respectively. The signal SFE(t) used by the fine timing
acquisition algorithm (see Section III) has the shape shown
in Fig. 3a. We have represented only the pulses above the
threshold to ease the drawing. In Fig. 3a we have intro-
duced two new parameters: Δpf and Δh. Specifically, Δpf
represents the delay between the highest pulse and the first
pulse in rM (t), while Δh represents the time dispersion of
the propagation channel between verifier and prover. For the
following discussion it is useful to define ΔS  Δback−Δpf .
For ΔT < Tpr, three different cases are possible depending
on the value of ΔT .
1) ΔT ∈ [0,ΔS] (Fig. 3a). In this case, the first pulse of
the legitimate signal is correctly identified by the prover.
The fine timing acquisition gives a correct estimate of
the TOA, i.e., τˆf = τf , where τˆf represents the estimate
of τf . The overshadow attack is ineffective.
2) ΔT ∈ (ΔS ,ΔS +Δh] (Fig. 3b). In this case, a non-
first pulse of the legitimate signal is identified as the
first pulse, and thus the overshadow attack produces a
timing enlargement. However, this enlargement is not
controllable by the adversary since it depends on the
propagation channels between V and P, and M and P.
Thus, we have τˆf > τf but τˆf = τf +ΔT .
3) ΔT ∈ (ΔS +Δh, Tpr) (Fig. 3c). In this case, the first
pulse of the malicious signal is identified as the first
pulse, i.e., τˆf = τf +ΔT . This is the only situation in
which M is able to introduce a timing enlargement equal
to ΔT .
The case ΔT ≥ Tpr can be dealt with in a similar manner.
Note that ΔS and Δh depend on the channel, which is not
deterministic. So, for a fixed ΔT , the occurrence of each of
the three cases will be expressed as a probability.
We simulated overshadow attacks to test their feasibility
in a standard residential scenario (CM1) [10]. The signal
parameters are set as done in [9]. The performance of the
attacks has been assessed by measuring the mean absolute
error (MAE) of the enlargement, i.e. the difference between
the achieved enlargement and the target enlargement. We
simulated both a regular adversary, which experiences an M-
P channel following the CM1 model, and a close adversary,
for which the M-P link can essentially be characterized by a
single, line-of-sight, component. We assumed a signal-to-noise
ratio Es/N0 = 30 dB, where Es is the energy of a symbol,
and N0 is the noise spectral power density.
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Fig. 3. Overshadow attack. Full and empty marks represent the components of SFE(t) associated to the signal transmitted by V and M, respectively.
TABLE I
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR OF THE ENLARGEMENT
case 1 case 2 case 3
regular adversary (no effect) 7.79m 0.15m
close adversary (no effect) 8.52m 0.14m
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Fig. 4. Probability of No Effect (NE), Uncontrollable Effect (UE) and
Controllable Effect (CE) cases with a regular adversary.
Table I shows the values of MAE in cases 2 and 3. As
expected, the overshadow attack is effective and controllable
only when case 3 occurs, both for regular and for close adver-
sary. Observe that an attack with an uncontrollable effect could
also be useful for an adversary. However, this is not the case in
trilateration-based positioning in which the enlargement must
be controllable in order the position to be spoofed in a coherent
manner.
Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate the probability of the above
three cases as a function of the target distance enlargement
ΔD = ΔT · c/2, with the regular and the close adversary,
respectively. Experiments confirmed that a controllable attack
(i.e., occurrence of case 3) is impossible for many values
of ΔD , and reaches the maximum probability of 18% at
ΔD = Tpr · c/2 = 19.2m. Such a probability does not
increase in the case of an adversary with a strong line-of-sight
component.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed the feasibility of overshadow-based enlarge-
ment attacks against distance-bounding protocols implemented
on 802.15.4a. In an overshadow attack, the adversary receives
and retransmits a legitimate packet with a certain delay and
a stronger power. In this way, she tries to delay the entire
process of round-trip time measurement. In contrast with
what generally assumed by the literature, we showed that
overshadow attacks are not easy to carry out. Depending on the
delay introduced by the adversary, in the majority of cases they
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Fig. 5. Probability of No Effect (NE), Uncontrollable Effect (UE) and
Controllable Effect (CE) cases with a close adversary.
have no effect or their effect is not controllable. We estimated
by simulations the delay ranges and the probability with which
the adversary can obtain a controllable effect.
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